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ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: HOW IN RE
VENTURE MORTGAGE FUND EXPOSES THE
INEQUITABLE RESULTS OF NEW YORK'S
USURY REMEDIES
Shimon A. Berger*
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, usury laws protected needy and desperate debtors
from lenders' outrageous demands.1 The protection of the needy
and desperate, of the uninformed and unsuspecting, has been the
upstanding principle behind these laws.2 Usury laws are one of the
earliest forms of consumer protection law,3 having been in place
over a millennia and within a wide Variety of cultures in order to
protect "the needy from the greedy."4 This ideal was seemingly
not in dispute in 1787 when Jeremy Bentham posed the classic free-
dom of contract objection to usury regulation.5 While he postu-
lated that, "no person of 'sound mind' who is 'acting freely' should
be hindered from striking a loan bargain on terms she finds accept-
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the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their help with this Note. I especially want to
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1. Ronald Goldstock & Dan T. Coenen, Controlling the Contemporary Loan-
shark: The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of Witness Fear, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 127, 180-84 (1980) (describing the societal problems caused by loan sharking).
2. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 160 (1988) ("Protection of the vulnerable is one of the oldest moti-
vations for consumer protection.").
3. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Ser-
vices Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 657 (2000)
(describing the increase of fringe banking and predatory lending practices).
4. Id.
5. Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscio-
nability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates
Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 Hous. L. REV. 721, 728 (1994) (calling for
the adoption of an unconscionability standard of usury regulation rather than the
traditional usury regime).
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able,"6 usury proponents disagreed, claiming that Bentham's ideal
contradicts the moral policies that require usury regulation.7 They
have decried Bentham's depiction of loan bargaining as "rosy-eyed
and idealistic."8 To add to the debate, outrageous episodes of
lender abuse in the 1990s have bolstered a strong consumer protec-
tion movement.9 Some initiatives have focused on the inadequa-
cies of current systems in regulating certain lending activities, 10
such as the new loan sharks who operate "auto-title pawns" (or
"title loans"), i" and "payday lenders."' 2 Others have focused on
modern predatory lending practices, which threaten desperate and
needy borrowers. 13
6. Id. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF USURY (1787), reprinted in 3
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3 (Russell & Russell 1962) (John Bowring ed.,
William Tait 1843)).
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Morris, supra note 2, at 156) (challenging Bentham's free market
argument).
9. Id. at 811; see infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing modern
episodes of lender abuse).
10. Bender, supra note 5, at 807; Drysdale & Keest, supra note 3, passim.
11. In an "auto-title pawn," sometimes referred to as a "title loan," the lender
offers a small loan secured by a nonpurchase money interest in the borrower's car.
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 3, at 598. In some instances, the loan is structured as a
"buy-leaseback" transaction, where the borrower pledges the title to the vehicle over
to the lender, with the lender leasing the vehicle back to the borrower. Id. Other
lenders will actually require the customer to turn over a key to the car, in order to
simplify repossession if the borrower defaults. Id. Abuses in this area include the
following examples: a woman who lost her car to repossession after paying $400 in
interest on a $250 loan; a borrower living on income from social security disability
who borrowed $500 to pay medical bills, but ended up losing his truck when, after
paying more than $2000 in interest payments over the course of a year and a half, he
still owed $ 612; a borrower who paid $370 per month over twenty months ($7400) on
a $1700 loan to cover for mortgage payments, but still owed $2070 in order to protect
the family car from repossession by the title lender. Id. at 607.
12. Payday lending involves very short-term cash loans, commonly under $1000
for a term of two weeks. Id. at 601. The borrower generally advances a postdated
check for the principal amount plus a "fee," and the lender advances cash in the sum
of the principal. Id. At the end of the loan term, the borrower pays the principal plus
the fee to redeem the check, or allows the lender to deposit the check to pay off the
loan. Id. If the borrower cannot repay the loan, he may extend the loan for another
"fee," or he can borrow the cash to pay off the first loan from another lender, with
another added "fee," which can lead to a pyramid effect. Id.
13. Predatory lending practices normally involve factors such as the following: the
borrower does not have full knowledge and understanding of the terms of the loan;
there is no affirmative disclosure to the borrower of all material information regard-
ing the terms of the loan and the borrower's rights; the lender obscures material infor-
mation about the loan terms; there is pressure to induce the borrower to enter into
the loan agreement; the lender has knowledge that the borrower's income is insuffi-
cient to meet the terms of the loan; there is a pattern of targeting vulnerable popula-
tions for the purpose of making high-cost loans. Deborah Goldstein, Note, Protecting
2194
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What has since emerged from the usury debate amounts to a dis-
tinction between borrowing by unsophisticated or desperate par-
ties, and borrowing in a commercial context, which presumes a
level of sophistication and equal footing.14 Usury regulations in
most states "treat corporate or business borrowers differently than
consumer borrowers."'" This manifests itself in allowing higher in-
terest rate ceilings for corporate borrowers, exempting corporate
loans from usury limits altogether, and even extending the "corpo-
rate exemption" to business loans generally.' 6 Yet, even in a com-
mercial context, small businesses may have less familiarity with
commercial transactions and might suffer as much as unsophistica-
ted consumer borrowers. 7 On the other hand, usury opponents,
realizing the consumer justifications for strong usury regimes, ar-
gue that legislators should resist reaching for the blunt instrument
of usury to restore contractual order in the marketplace,' 8 arguing
for a cost justification standard of unconscionability. 19
However, most of the usury debate today focuses on the usury
laws themselves. Should interest limits be adopted, or should
states turn to the unconscionability standard as their model to com-
bat predatory lending? 20 There are also advocates and consumer
protection groups that promote new legislation addressing loop-
Consumers from Predatory Lenders: Defining the Problem and Moving Toward Work-
able Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 233 (2000) (describing the elements
and problems of predatory banking).
14. Bender, supra note 5, at 791.
15. Id.
16. Id. Many states exempt loans to corporations from their usury statutes on the
theory that unlike consumer loans, corporate loans were negotiated at arm's length.
Infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. Thus, some have argued that the exemp-
tion should apply to all business loans, whether made to a corporation or other busi-
ness entity, such as a partnership, LLC, or sole proprietorship.
17. Bender, supra note 5, at 792.
18. Id. at 811.
19. Id. The unconscionability standard operates within the general law of con-
tracts, where unconscionability is invoked to deny specific performance of a contract
for grossly inadequate consideration or to generally police unfairness in contracts. Id.
at 735. A traditional usury regime relies on certain discrete elements in order to trig-
ger a violation, such as specific types of loans over specified interest rates. Id. How-
ever, the unconscionability standard favors a flexible case-by-case fairness standard,
which includes proof of procedural unfairness and interest rates that are grossly exor-
bitant in the context of a case-by-case factual analysis. Id.
20. Compare Morris, supra note 2, at 178-79 (advocating usury regulation as the
most effective way of controlling debt), with Bender, supra note 5, at 811 (advocating
the standard of unconscionability to regulate predatory lending and "to restore con-
tractual order in the marketplace").
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holes that allow "fringe banking predatory lending" 21 to flourish.22
The current debate, however, has not adequately focused on the
various usury remedies and their impact on equitable policy con-
cerns. Usury remedies are notoriously nonuniform,23 but usury
penalties have historically been more severe than they are now. 24
The most common remedy for usury violations is the disallowance
of the entire interest charged.25 A few states void only the interest
that exceeds the usury limit,26 but most usury regimes levy some
additional sanction, such as the forfeiture of all the interest, as a
deterrent.27 However, some states still impose severe punitive civil
21. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 3, at 589; supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text (describing some elements of predatory lending, such as the "auto-pawn title"
loans and "payday lenders").
22. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 3, passim.
23. Bender, supra note 5, at 789.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 790 n.346 (citing DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW
§ 10.07 (1991)).
26. Id. at 790; e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2304(b) (2001) (Delaware: borrower
not required to pay the creditor the excess over the lawful rate); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 408.050 (2001) (Missouri: borrower may sue usurer for any and all sums paid in
excess of the principal and legal rate of interest); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-117(a)
(2001) (Tennessee: usurious contract shall not be enforceable; but the lender may sue
to recover the principal actually advanced, plus lawful interest); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 50 (2001) (Vermont: borrower may recover the amount paid above the legal
interest).
27. Bender, supra note 5, at 790; e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-8-12(a) (2001) (Alabama:
usurious contracts cannot be enforced except as to the principal); ARIz. REV. STAT.
§ 44-1202 (2001) (Arizona: usurer forfeits all interest); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-10(a)
(2001) (Georgia: usurer shall forfeit the entire interest; no further penalty or forfei-
ture shall be allowed); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 205/6 (2001) (Illinois: borrower may
recover twice the total of all interest); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3501 (West 2001)
(Louisiana: usurious contract results in the forfeiture of the entire interest); MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 12-114(a) (2001) (Maryland: usurer forfeits the greater of
three times the amount of excess illegal interest, or $500); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 438.32(2) (2001) (Michigan: usurer barred from the recovery of any interest); MINN.
STAT. § 334.02 (2001) (Minnesota: borrower may recover the full amount of interest
paid); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-108(1) (2001) (Montana: usurious contract shall be
deemed a forfeiture of a sum double the amount of interest); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-
105 (2001) (Nebraska: usurious contract shall not be void, but usurer shall recover
only the principal, without any interest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-3 (West 2001) (New
Jersey: in usurious contract, no more than the amount actually lent, without interest,
may be recovered); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (2001) (North Carolina: penalty for usury
shall be the forfeiture of the entire interest); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-10 (2001)
(North Dakota: usury shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest and a forfei-
ture of twenty-five percent of the principal); OKLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (Oklahoma:
usurious loans shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest); 41 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 502 (2001) (Pennsylvania: borrower may recover triple the amount of excess illegal
interest); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a) (2001) (Texas: usurer is liable for the
greater amount of: (1) three times the amount of illegal interest less the legal interest
allowed; or (2) $2,000 or twenty percent of the principal, whichever is less); WASH.
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sanctions, denying the recovery of not only the interest but the
loan principal as well.28 Additionally, only a few states provide for
criminal penalties for usury violations.29 How these various ap-
REV. CODE § 19.52.030(1) (2001) (Washington: usurious contract shall not be void,
but the creditor shall only be entitled to the principal); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (2001)
(West Virginia: usurious contracts shall be void as to all interest, and the borrower
may recover four times all interest agreed to be paid, and in any event, a minimum of
$100); WIs. STAT. § 138.06(1) (2001) (Wisconsin: usurious contracts shall be valid to
recover the principal amount loaned in excess of $2,000, but no interest may be
recovered).
28. Bender, supra note 5, at 790; e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (Arkansas Con-
stitution: usurer forfeits the principal and interest of usurious consumer loans); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-57-106 (2002) (Arkansas Code: usurious contracts shall be void); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5-107(1) (2001) (Maine: if usurer threatens borrower with
violence to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property as a means to enforce
repayment, the loan is unenforceable); MINN. STAT. § 334.03 (2001) (Minnesota: usu-
rious loans shall be void); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000) (New
York: usurious loans shall be void); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(a) (2001) (Rhode Island:
usurious loans shall be void); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.002(a) (2001) (Texas: lender
who charges interest that is greater than twice the interest rate authorized forfeits the
principal amount and any interest charged); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.47 (2001) (Vir-
ginia: usurious contract shall be null, void, and unenforceable by the lender).
29. Bender, supra note 5, at 790; e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3(b) (2001) (Califor-
nia: usurer is guilty of a felony, and is punishable by state imprisonment for not more
than five years or jailing by the county jail for not more than one year); CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (2002) (Colorado: creditor of loan contract that charges an inter-
est rate exceeding forty-five percent commits the crime of criminal usury, which is a
class 6 felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21-47(a) (2001) (Connecticut: usurer shall be
guilty of a class D felony); FLA. STAT. ch. 687.071(2)-(4) (2002) (Florida: provider of
loan with interest rate exceeding twenty-five percent but not in excess of forty-five
percent, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor in the second degree; provider of loan with
interest rate exceeding forty-five percent, shall be guilty of a felony of the third de-
gree; an extortionate extension of credit or where, "the creditor ... had a reputa-
tion . . . for the use or threat of use of violence . . . to cause harm to the person,
reputation, or property of any person to collect extensions of credit or to punish the
nonrepayment thereof," shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree); GA. CODE
ANN. § 7-4-18 (2001) (Georgia: loans bearing interest rate of more than five percent
per month, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor); HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-6 (2001) (Ha-
waii: usurer shall be fined not more than $250, or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a) (2001) (Massachusetts: provider of loan
with an interest rate greater than twenty percent shall be guilty of criminal usury,
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or both); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 438.41(1) (2001) (Michigan: lender charging
interest on a loan at a rate exceeding twenty-five percent is guilty of criminal usury,
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed five years or fined not more than $10,000,
or both); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2000) (New York: lender charging
interest on a loan at a rate exceeding twenty-five percent is guilty of criminal usury in
the second degree, a class E felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-11 (2001) (North Da-
kota: usurer shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor); Wis. STAT. § 138.06(2) (2001)
(Wisconsin: usurer may be fined not less than $25 nor more than $500, or imprisoned
not more than six months, or both).
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proaches to usury remedies impact the general usury debate has
not been adequately explored.
This Note evaluates New York's usury remedy regime, which is
among the most severe in the country. This Note focuses exclu-
sively on the ramifications of New York's severe usury remedy re-
gime, and how it leads to inequitable results which are contrary to
the underlying purpose of the usury laws. These inequitable results
are illustrated by the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy
Court's decision in In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P.3 0 and subse-
quent decisions which reflect a basic flaw in New York's usury
laws. Part I of this Note discusses the history of New York's usury
laws, focusing on their origins and public policy concerns that have
been applied throughout the ages. Part II analyzes In re Venture
Mortgage Fund and subsequent decisions, including a discussion of
the background of the failed ponzi scheme that led to the ongoing
bankruptcy proceedings in the case. Part III analyzes New York's
usury remedies as compared to other remedy regimes, and argues
that the New York legislature should adopt remedies that more ad-
equately reflect the equitable purpose of the usury laws. This Note
concludes that although the forfeiture of principal is a useful deter-
rent, the adoption of a discretionary standard will provide equita-
ble results and at the same time keep the deterrent factor in place.
I. HISTORY OF NEW YORK'S USURY LAWS
A. Origins of American Usury Law - Usury in Medieval
Europe and England
The history of credit, and thus usury, dates back to ancient times.
According to some historians, credit long predates industry, bank-
ing, coinage, and probably even money.31 Along with the discov-
ery of credit came the concept of charging some form of
compensation for the extension of the credit.32 Ever since man dis-
covered credit and later, the monetary system, societies have been
developing ways to regulate credit and the amount of compensa-
tion charged for credit.33 The first recorded usury laws date back
30. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 245 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd
282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002).
31. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 148
(2000) (citing SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 3
(3d ed. 1991)) (discussing the origins of usury regulation).
32. Id. "Loans at interest may be said to have begun when the Neolithic farmer
made a loan of seed to a cousin and expected more back at harvestime." Id. (quoting
HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 31, at 3).
33. Id.
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to around 1800 B.C.E. in the Code of Hammurabi, which con-
tained statutory limitations on interest rates.34 The Romans placed
an interest cap limit at eight and one-third percent.35 However,
these limitations on interest rates usually had little practical effect;
when market rates were higher than the legal rate, the legal rate
was usually simply ignored.36
The Bible and English statutory and common law were the
strongest influences on the regulation of usury and abusive interest
rates in the United States.37 In medieval Europe, usury laws were
under the influence of the Catholic Church ("the Church"), which
prohibited lending for any profit. Thus, no amount or rate of inter-
est on a loan was allowed, and the Church repeatedly condemned
the assessment of usury.38 The Church based its condemnation on
the Bible, which specifically prohibited interest taking in three sep-
arate verses. 39 The Church shared the belief of many other socie-
ties throughout history that the taking of interest was unjust, which
stemmed from a desire to prevent the exploitation of the needy.4
The Church used this rationale to target the medieval equivalent of
the "loan shark," because a loan often represented an unequal bar-
gaining position by the lender, leading to possible exploitation of
the borrower.41 Moreover, the Church felt that interest would en-
able the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer.42 As in the
rest of medieval Europe, the Church was also the chief authority
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 75 (cited in Zywicki, supra 31, at 148).
37. Bender, supra note 5, at 725.
38. KEVIN W. BROWN & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT
REGULATION § 2.2.1, at 20 (1987); MARK H. LEYMASTER, CONSUMER USURY AND
CREDIT OVERCHARGES § 3.3, at 23 (1982); see generally ROGER FENTON, A TREATISE
OF USURIE 1-66 (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Ltd., Walter J. Johnson, Inc. 1975) (1611)
(discussing the biblical definition of usury and the biblical authority to prohibit
usury).
39. Exodus 22:25 ("If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee,
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."); Leviti-
cus 25:36-37 ("Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy
brother may live with thee. Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend
him thy victuals for increase."); Deuteronomy 23:19-20 ("Thou shalt not lend upon
usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent
upon usury. Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou
shalt not lend upon usury.").
40. Alastair McIntosh & Wayne Visser, Short Review of the Historical Critique of
Usury, in ACCOUNTING, BUSINESS & FINANCIAL HISTORY § 8:2, at 180 (1998).
41. Id.
42. FENTON, supra note 38, at 98-107; McIntosh & Visser, supra note 40, at 180.
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on the regulation of usury in medieval England, in both its prohibi-
tion and its enforcement.43 The penalties for practicing usury, as
administered by the Catholic authorities, usually included the for-
feiture of the entire loan principal and the return of any loan prin-
cipal or interest payments already collected." The religious
penalties typically included a censure from the Church and excom-
munication. 5 Furthermore, the lender was denied a Christian bur-
ial until his estate paid back any usury or principal. 46
Early English secular usury statutes also prohibited the taking of
any interest. The earliest usury statutes in England date back to
the laws of Alfred the Great and later the laws of Edward the Con-
fessor and William the Conqueror.47 These early statutes served
mainly to strengthen the Church's usury prohibition by setting an
absolute ban on usury, prohibiting the charging of any interest, and
exacting civil penalties in addition to those already administered by
the Church.4 8 The usury statute of Edward III in 134149 gave the
Church the authority to administer penalties during the life of the
usurer, while the crown was given control over usury enforcement
after the usurer's death. This included having the usurer's goods
forfeited to the king,50 and his lands returned to the lord of the
fee.51 England further enacted usury statutes in 148752 and 1494, 53
during the reign of Henry VII, which greatly enhanced the crown's
control over usury regulation and enforcement. These statutes
called for usury cases to be brought in the courts of the crown,
43. J.B.C. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF USURY 41 (1866).
44. JAMES A. WEBB, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF USURY § 5, at 4 (1899).
45. Id.
46. FENTON, supra note 38, at 70-72; WEBB, supra note 44, § 5, at 4.
47. MURRAY, supra note 43, at 33.
48. FENTON, supra note 38, at 71; MURRAY, supra note 43, at 33; WEBB, supra
note 44, § 5, at 4.
49. 15 Edw. 3 c. 5 (1341) (Eng.).
50. FENTON, supra note 38, at 70-72; MURRAY, supra note 43, at 33; WEBB, supra
note 44, at § 5, at 4.
51. A medieval lord's estate consisted of the lord's personal house and grounds,
personal cultivable land, and land held by tenants, who were known as serfs. David A.
Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History,
34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143, 190 (1999). The serfs' interest in the land was
known as a "fee," which gave them a right to occupy the land in consideration for
services or produce paid to the lord, or lord of the fee. Id. at 202. A "fee simple"
interest was inheritable without restrictions and potentially endless in duration. After
the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290, it also became transferable without the consent of
the lord. Id. at 175. Thus, the usurer in Medieval England risked having his fee simple
interest forfeited to the lord. WEBB, supra note 44, § 5, at 4.
52. 3 Hen. 7, c. 5 (1487) (Eng.).
53. 11 Hen. 7, c. 8 (1494) (Eng.).
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common law courts, and local tribunals, instead of solely in the ec-
clesiastical courts.54 Thus, for much of the early period of English
legal history, usury laws adhered to Canon Law55 and Church doc-
trine, totally outlawing the charging of interest.
In early sixteenth century Europe, it was realized that the com-
plete prohibition of lending for profit impeded economic develop-
ment,56 and as a result, the religious opposition shifted from an
absolute usury prohibition to a less stringent standard of a "moral
opposition to abusive interest."57 With growing trade and com-
merce, the tension between the need for economic development
and the desire to insulate society from excessive, and sometimes
oppressive, debt became more difficult to balance.58 This was espe-
cially true for the merchants, traders, and industrialists who needed
extra capital to expand their commercial enterprises. 59 The contin-
uing power of the Church made it difficult to simply ignore the
usury restrictions when they became inconvenient, 6° and so lenders
and borrowers began to devise creative ways of evading usury re-
strictions. 61 These included formulating various exceptions to the
absolute prohibition of usury, which were accepted, or at least tol-
erated, by the Church.62 These exceptions were "mainly twisted
logical explanations, convenient doctrines, and clever legal fictions
that the Church leaders were either unable or disinclined to re-
ject. '' 63 Thus, despite the Church's "absolute" ban on lending
money for interest, usury was present throughout the Middle
Ages.64
The exceptions to avoid the usury restrictions of the late Middle
Ages demonstrated the power of the merchant and industrialist
54. MURRAY, supra note 43, at 45. In England, the ecclesiastical courts had juris-
diction over matters concerning the established church and religious matters. BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 530 (7th ed. 1999).
55. Canon Law is the body of Roman Catholic jurisprudence that was complied
between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 198 (7th ed.
1999).
56. Morris, supra note 2, at 153.
57. Bender, supra note 5, at 725.
58. Morris, supra note 2, at 153.
59. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 38, § 2.2.1, at 19.
60. Zywicki, supra note 31, at 149.
61. Id.
62. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 38, § 2.2.1, at 20-21; LEYMASTER, supra note 38,
§ 3.3, at 23.
63. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 38, § 2.2.1, at 21; LEYMASTER, supra note 38,
§ 3.3, at 23.
64. Zywicki, supra note 31, at 149.
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market and the difficulties of credit regulation. 65 These imagina-
tive exceptions also hindered the ability of regulators to prevent
commercial credit deals from occurring. 66 For example, among the
exceptions was a credit sale or "time-price" exception,67 the hazard
of principal or investment exception, 68 the "contract of redemp-
tion" or "bills of exchange" exception 69 (used especially in mining
enterprises), and the infamous contractum trinius or "triple con-
tract. ' 7° Besides these various exceptions to evade the usury laws,
underground lending at interest was also a widespread practice, de-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Essentially, a merchant was allowed to quote two prices on an item: one, if
cash was to be paid today, and another, usually higher, if the payment was to be made
at some later time. LEYMASTER, supra note 38, § 3.3. This exception was devised by
Medieval European merchants who were transferring funds from one city to another
and wanted to take advantage of and profit from exchange rate differentials. Id. at
§ 3.3 n.67.
68. If the lender gave over the money to a tradesman or merchant for a business
purpose, and stipulated that he would be subject to any losses, he had put his "princi-
pal in hazard." BROWN & KEEST, supra note 38, § 2.2.1, at 20. He had in fact invested
the money, not lent it, and retained ownership in the money (up to his share). Id.
Thus, the lender was entitled to any profits as well. Id. The charge above the amount
of principal was not usury, but the lender's share in the profits; the arrangement was
viewed as a partnership. Id. This practice led to many abuses, as intricate contracts
were set up under the guise of investments and hazards to principal, when the hazards
themselves were based on contrived contingencies only. Id.; FENTON, supra note 38, at
19, 25.
69. These involved highly sophisticated sale and bargain agreements that were re-
ally usurious contracts under the guise of sales. FENTON, supra note 38, at 58, 142-43.
They normally involved a loan attached with the sale of an item with a repurchase
option at some later day, usually at a lower price. Id. at 142. The overall effect
amounted to an artificial gain for the lender (original seller), who ended up with his
original item back and more cash. Id. Because the gain arose under the guise of a sale
and not from the loan, it was not considered usurious. Id. at 143.
70. This was a legal trick used by European merchants in the Middle Ages to
allow borrowing at usury. Ackerman, supra note 36, at 77.
It was a combination of three separate contracts, each of which was deemed
permissible by the Church, but which together yielded a fixed rate of return
from the outset. For example, [the first contract would call for] Person A [to
lend] £100 [to] Person B for one year. [In the second contract], A would then
sell back to B the right to any profit over and above say £30, for a fee of £15
to be paid by B. Finally, [in the third contract], A would insure himself
against any loss of wealth ... at a cost to A of £5 paid to B. The [net] result
of these three simultaneously agreed contracts was an interest payment of
£10 [£15 fee to A less the £5 fee to B] on a loan of £100 made by A to B.
Tarek El Diwany, Islamic Banking Isn't Islamic, at http://www.islamic-finance.com/
indexnew.htm; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 202-
48 (1957) (discussing the "triple contract" and other usury evading devices).
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spite the absolute ban on usury.71 Peasants, nobles, and merchants
all had access to an underground credit market for profit.72
While the Church's ban on usury may not have been absolute, it
was often at least moderately effective.73 The Church's sweeping
prohibition of interest was neither casually enforced nor lightly re-
garded by social political leaders and the common man of the
time.7 1 Indeed, the usury prohibition altered significantly the na-
ture of banking and seemed to impose real limits on certain types
of lending.75
B. The First Modern Usury Statutes
With the beginning of the Protestant Reformation in early six-
teenth century Europe, some Christian theologians began to rein-
terpret the biblical restriction on usury to accommodate the needs
of trade and development. 76 While still attempting to control lend-
ers on moral grounds, the new interpretations allowed lending for
profit so long as the interest charged did not "shock the con-
science. '7 7 Some Protestants, especially those of the "French
School, ' 78 agreed that interest taken from the desperate or needy
was indeed forbidden and quite despicable. 79 However, loans
given for business or commercial purposes, where both parties
could bargain at arm's length, was not considered exploitative.8"
Additionally, only high or excessive interest rates were considered
abusive, while low rates were reasonable.81 John Calvin's writings
on usury enumerated seven rules in which interest taking was pro-
71. 2 C.G.A. CLAY, ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ENGLAND
1500-1700, at 233 (1984).
72. Id.
73. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be:
An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2
(1998) (discussing the origins and historical policy concerns of usury regulation).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Morris, supra note 2, at 153.
77. Id. This standard was the precursor to the standard of unconscionability.
78. The "French School" was a very procapitalist group of early Protestants
originating in France. NOONAN, supra note 70, at 365-72. They believed that civil
governments should act independently from the Church in creating policies affecting
their citizens. Id. Furthermore, they believed that civil governments should be con-
cerned with efficient markets, not enforcing Catholic doctrine. Id. One of the great
proponents of the "French School" of thought was John Calvin of Geneva. Id. at 366.
79. NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS: USURY AND LAW IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 16 (1989); NOONAN, supra note 70, at 366.
80. NOONAN, supra note 70, at 368.
81. RICHARD H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 109 (1926).
Tawney used an analogy to profits. Just as excessive profit was unjust and immoral,
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hibited.82 First, it is forbidden to make a living of usury by generat-
ing a custom or trade of it (charging interest once or twice was not
usury). Second, usury must not be taken from the poor or needy.83
Third, a lender must not be addicted to gain, but rather must al-
ways be ready and willing to furnish a free loan to a poor neighbor
who is in need.84 Fourth, the golden rule8" must always be kept.86
Fifth, the interest rate should be reasonable.87 Sixth, the borrower
must be treated with respect.88 Seventh, the rate should not exceed
the limit placed upon it by the respective government.89 Calvin's
followers generally ignored these rules, interpreting his writings as
"a wholesale sanctioning of interest."9 The rules were interpreted
to mean that usury and interest were not per se forbidden, as long
as the usurer was careful not to oppress the debtor and followed
his heart to do what was right.91
while reasonable profit was valid, so was excessive interest prohibited, while reasona-
ble interest was permitted. Id.
82. FENTON, supra note 38, at 62.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The golden rule in the Judeo-Christian ethic traces its origin to the Biblical
commandment: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Leviticus 19:18. Jesus re-
iterated the rule by stating:
You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,
and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a
second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. All the Law and
the Prophets hang on these two commandments.
Matthew 22:38-40. This evolved into the golden rule: "So in everything, do to others
what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets."
Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31 ("Do to others as you would have them do to you."). The
golden rule is prominent in the ethics of Judaism and many other religious and moral
teachings. E.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbos 31a:
A certain gentile came [to Hillel] and said to him, make me a proselyte, on
condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I stand on one foot ....
[Hillel] said to him, what is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is
the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn.
86. FENTON, supra note 38, at 62.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. McIntosh & Visser, supra note 40, at 177.
91. JONES, supra note 79, at 45-46. It should be noted that, while the Calvinists
and the Protestants of the "French School" were generally in favor of permitting
usury, other reformation groups were not. Martin Luther initially took a strong
stance against usury and, like some leading Catholics, strictly condemned the practice.
ROGER LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN 153 (1964); TAWNEY, supra note 81,
at 95. He preached against the practice of taking any interest and thoroughly con-
demned the Pope for the many "devices" that the Church permitted to evade the
usury prohibition. FENTON, supra note 38, at 142-43. One such exception, the "con-
tract of redemption" exception, so enraged Luther that he called the Pope the an-
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This new idea influenced the "modern" English usury statutes of
the mid-sixteenth century. These were the first European usury
statutes that rejected the Church's absolute prohibition on interest
taking. Instead, they placed a statutory limit on the permissible
rate of interest.9 2 The first of these statutes was passed by the En-
glish Parliament in 1545 during the reign of King Henry VIII, enti-
tled "An Act Against Usury. ' 93 This statute provided for an
interest rate ceiling of up to "ten in the hundredth" (ten percent).94
The adoption of an interest rate ceiling became the foundation of
English usury law.95
While this statute was repealed in 1552,96 the English Parliament
reenacted the statute in 1570. 97 The 1570 statute permanently le-
galized an interest rate ceiling, and became the foundation of En-
glish usury law.98 In 1624, the interest rate ceiling was lowered to
eight percent, 99 and in 1660 lowered further to six percent. 1°° Fi-
nally, in 1713, the Statute of Anne 1°' set the rate at five percent.10 2
The early usury statutes in the United States were directly de-
rived from the English statutes.0 3 During the eighteenth century,
the American colonies enacted usury statutes modeled after the
English Statute of Anne of 1713.°4 The states retained their body
of English Law, including their usury statutes. 05 Newly admitted
states, in turn, generally copied their usury laws from existing
tichrist for allowing it. Id. at 143. However, he later moderated his strong views,
claiming that "paying interest was no sin" and that "interest which does not exceed 4
or 5 percent is not immoral." Ackerman, supra note 36, at 78. Though he still had
reservations about the practice of usury, he assured his followers that it was lawful
within a reasonable interest rate ceiling. Id.
92. Bender, supra note 5, at 725.
93. 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (Eng.).
94. Id.
95. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 38, § 2.2.1, at 20; MURRAY, supra note 43, at 45;
WEBB, supra note 44, § 5, at 4.
96. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 20 (1552) (Eng.).
97. 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1570) (Eng.).
98. Ackerman, supra note 36, at 82.
99. 21 Jac., c. 17 (1624) (Eng.).
100. 12 Car. 2, c. 13 (1660) (Eng.).
101. 13 Ann., c. 15 (1713) (Eng.).
102. Interestingly, in the mid-1800s, many European countries abolished their
usury restrictions. England repealed all laws against usury in 1854, followed by Den-
mark in 1855, Spain in 1856, Holland in 1857, Belgium in 1865, and Prussia in 1867.
Ackerman, supra note 36, at 82.
103. Id. at 85.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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states.116 By 1886, every state had a usury statute with an interest
rate ceiling, usually between six and eight percent.107
C. New York's Usury Statutes-From Colonial Days to
the 1960s
New York's first usury law was passed in 1717, which expired
after five years."' Another usury act was passed in 1737 which
voided usurious obligations and imposed upon the lender a penalty
of triple the value of the money loaned, with one half of the forfei-
ture to be paid to the king and the other half to the borrower.10 9
After New York became a state, the legislature passed a usury law
in 1787 which retained the essential provisions of the colonial
act.'1 0 The new law limited the amount of the penalty to the un-
lawful excess interest, giving one half to the borrower and the
other half to the state for use by the poor of the town where the
offense was committed."' Despite the fact that usurious loans
were voided in these early statutes, the New York courts recog-
nized the borrower's moral obligation to repay the money which he
had received." 2 The courts of equity went so far as to require the
borrower to repay or offer to repay the loan, together with lawful
interest, in order to obtain relief." 3
In 1827, a commission for revising New York's statutes was
formed proposing various changes to the usury law. 14 One of the
proposals was to permit the lender to recover the money actually
loaned, while voiding the recovery of any interest.' 15 The borrower
would then be able to collect three times the amount of the interest
in excess of the legal limit. 1t 6 However, the legislature rejected
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Curtis v. Teller, 143 N.Y.S. 188, 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913) (citing 1 Colonial
Laws, p. 909, c. 328); see also People v. Brown, 603 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993) ("Usury statutes have existed . . . since colonial times.") (citing Curtis, 143
N.Y.S. at 188).
109. Curtis, 143 N.Y.S. at 192 (citing 2 Colonial Laws, p. 980, c. 660).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Laws 1787, c. 13; Revised Acts of 1801 (1 K. & R. 57); Revised Laws
of 1813 (1 R. L. 64)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Early v. Mahon, 19 Johns. 147 (N.Y. 1821); Fanning v. Dunham, 5
Johns. Ch. 122 (N.Y. Ch. 1821)).
114. Curtis, 143 N.Y.S. at 193 (citing Revisers' Report of R. S. pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3; 3 R.
S. (2d Ed.) p. 611 et seq.).
115. Id.
116. Id. However, the action had to be brought within one year of the offense. Id.
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these proposals,1 7 providing instead that no court of equity could
require the repayment of the loan as a condition to granting relief
to the borrower.1 8 Despite the legislature's attempts to eliminate
the requirement that the borrower pay back the loan as a condition
of obtaining any relief, the courts of equity still struggled to find a
way to make the borrower repay the loan principal.11 9 It was a
principle, so just and so long applied, that courts of equity were
unwilling to withdraw from that doctrine unless required to do so
by "clear and positive statutory enactment. 1 20 Throughout the
1820s and 1830s, the debate raged among lawmakers and judges.
Some contended that the borrower should return the principal of a
usurious loan, while others were opposed to the lender receiving
anything, going so far as calling for criminal sanctions."' By 1837,
the hardliners had won out, with the passing of an even more strin-
gent usury law.' 22 The new usury statute provided that all usurious
contracts and obligations were void. 12 3 A court of chancery could
not require the borrower to pay the principal or lawful interest as a
condition of granting relief.1 24 Furthermore, the lender could be
compelled to deliver all obligations and securities without the bor-
rower paying back anything.125 The civil usury statute also made
the taking of usury a misdemeanor.' 26 In 1881, usury was further
made a misdemeanor in the penal code.'27
One of the most significant amendments to New York's usury
law occurred in 1850. In Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Insur-
ance & Trust Co.,128 the New York Court of Appeals held that a
loan issued to a corporation that violated the legal rate of interest
was usurious and void. 12 9 In effect, this allowed corporations to
117. Id. (citing R. S. pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3; 1 R. S. 771, § 1 et. seq.).
118. Id. (citing 1 R. S. pp. 772, 773, § 8).
119. Id. at 193-95 (citing Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill 523, 533-37 (N.Y. 1845);
Livingston v. Harris, 11 Wend. 329 (N.Y. 1833)).
120. Id. at 194.
121. Id. at 195.
122. Laws 1837, c. 430 (1837), revising R. S. pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3 § 5; see Curtis, 143
N.Y.S. at 195.
123. Curtis, 143 N.Y.S. at 196 (citing Laws 1837, c. 430 § 1).
124. Id. (citing Laws 1837, c. 430 § 4).
125. Id. (citing Laws 1837, c. 430 § 5).
126. Id. (citing Laws 1837, c. 430 § 6).
127. Id. at 197 (citing N.Y. PENAL § 2400 (1881), as amended by Laws 1881, c. 676
(1881)).
128. 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
129. Id. at 362.
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employ a usury defense against their own negotiated loans.130 This
shocked the business community, which had always considered cor-
porate obligations excluded from usury, since they were negotiated
at arm's length.1 31 In immediate response to the decision, New
York became the first state to enact a statute that barred corpora-
tions from presenting usury defenses against their contractual obli-
gations. 132 This move was widely followed by other states. 33 In
1909 the entire usury statute was reenacted in the General Busi-
ness Law. 134 The law was essentially the same except that the pro-
vision for criminal liability, in existence since 1881 in both the civil
and criminal usury statutes, was finally omitted from the civil stat-
utes.'35 In 1963, all of New York's civil usury statutes were consoli-
dated in the General Obligations Law. 136
D. A New Era in New York's Usury Enforcement-The New
Criminal Usury Statute
The criminal usury provisions in the New York penal statutes
were, however, generally ineffective because of the many excep-
tions that applied. 137 In 1965, a state commission was formed to
investigate the loan sharking activities of organized crime in New
York."'38 The commission determined that to protect citizens, there
was a need to make the possession of loan shark records a criminal
130. Paul Golden, Evolution of Corporate Usury Laws Has Left Vestigial Statutes
That Hinder Business Transactions, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2001, at 20 (discussing New
York's outdated corporate usury statutes).
131. Id.
132. Id. The statute provided that, "[N]o corporation shall hereafter interpose the
defense of usury in any action." Id. The law is now codified in N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-521(1) (McKinney 2000).
133. Golden, supra note 130, at 20.
134. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 30, art. 25 (1909), as amended by Laws 1909, c. 25
(1909).
135. Curtis v. Teller, 143 N.Y.S. 188, 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913). Furthermore, the
new laws contained provisions made to conform to the fact that the court of chancery
had been abolished, calling what was formerly a bill in equity a complaint. Id.
136. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-501-5-531; see Szerdahelyi v. Harris, 490 N.E.2d
517, 521 (N.Y. 1986).
137. People v. Brown, 603 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing
Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d at 521, and Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn, Inc., 431 N.E.2d
278, 282 (N.Y. 1981)). For example, usury was a misdemeanor offense and applied
only "when loans of $800 or less bearing more than the authorized rate of interest,
[were] made to individuals by unlicensed lenders," or "only when tools, implements
of trade or household goods [were] taken as security." Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d at 522
n.3 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2400 (1963)).
138. Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d at 522; STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, THE
LOAN SHARK RACKET (1965) [hereinafter LOAN SHARK REPORT].
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offense and to increase the grade of offense for usurious lenders
who used "roughing up tactics" to enforce payment. 139 The investi-
gation also noted that loan sharks made it a policy to loan to corpo-
rations, or required that individual borrowers incorporate or set up
dummy corporations before being granted a usurious loan.140
These devices were used by loan sharks to evade the usury law as
the borrowing "corporation" could not present a usury defense.' 4'
Through these practices, lenders could demand usurious rates of
interest from desperate and unsophisticated borrowers cloaked
under a corporate veil.142 The legislature responded by enacting
sections 2401 and 2402 of the Penal Code, which upgraded to felo-
nies loans with interest rates over twenty-five percent. 4 3 The legis-
lature also allowed corporations to present a usury defense if the
loan violated criminal usury 44 because loan-sharking had "become
a major source of revenue," and legitimate businesses were being
over taken by loan sharks, a trend which existing laws could not
prevent.145 It was further found that, "[t]he criminal loan shark
can, and generally does, conduct his business wholly within the
law." '46 By passing the criminal usury statute, the legislature was
supported by the general policy concerns of New York's usury re-
gime, as the New York Court of Appeals noted:
The purpose of usury laws, from time immemorial, has been to
protect desperately poor people from the consequences of their
own desperation. Law-making authorities in almost all civiliza-
tions have recognized that the crush of financial burdens causes
people to agree to almost any conditions of the lender and to
consent to even the most improvident loans. Lenders, with the
money, have all the leverage; borrowers, in dire need of money,
have none. In recognizing this problem, the courts have drawn a
delicate balance by both enforcing legitimate business obliga-
139. Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d at 522; Hammelburger, 431 N.E.2d at 282; LOAN
SHARK REPORT, supra note 138, at 22, 29, 81-84.
140. Hammelburger, 431 N.E.2d at 283; see Schneider v. Phelps, 359 N.E.2d 1361,
1364-65 (N.Y. 1977) (finding that the usury laws could be easily avoided by establish-
ing a corporation, usually with no corporate assets and no other business, and making
the loan directly to the corporation, with the sole purpose of the 'dummy' corporation
to serve as a paper conduit for the loan).
141. Hammelburger, 431 N.E.2d at 283; supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
142. Schneider, 359 N.E.2d at 1364-65.
143. Criminal usury is now codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.40-190.42 (McKin-
ney 2000).
144. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(3) (McKinney 2000).
145. People v. Brown, 603 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing 1965 N.Y.
Laws 328, at 47).
146. Id. at 261 (citing 1965 N.Y. Laws 328, at 48).
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tions and by protecting impoverished debtors from improvident
transactions drawn by lenders and brought on by dire personal
financial stress.
147
The civil 148 and criminal 149 usury statutes enacted in 1965 remain
in effect today. Civil usury does not apply to any loan over
$250,000, but such loans are subject to criminal usury. 150 A loan of
$2,500,000 or more is exempt from all usury restrictions, including
criminal usury.151 This last provision is geared toward substantial
commercial loans and is a major reason that New York law often
governs many multistate loan transactions. 52 The penalty for a
usurious loan in New York is the forfeiture of all principal and in-
terest; essentially, the loan becomes wholly void.153 The borrower
can also recover the usurious portion of the interest previously
paid. 5 4 Criminal usury in New York is still defined as charging
twenty-five percent or more for a loan, and is a Class E felony with
the penalty of imprisonment of up to four years. 55 A loan with an
interest charge that exceeds twenty-five percent, together with con-
duct that is part of "a scheme or business of making or collecting
usurious loans," will result in a Class C felony charge and imprison-
ment of up to fifteen years. 56
147. Schneider v. Phelps, 359 N.E.2d 1361, 1364-66 (N.Y. 1977), quoted in Seidel v.
18 East 17th St. Owners, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 7, 9 (N.Y. 1992) ("[The purpose of] statutes
prohibiting usurious loans ... is 'to protect desperately poor people from the conse-
quences of their own desperation."'); see also Brown, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (criminal
usury was designed "to stop the professional loan sharks from obtaining control of
legitimate businesses and oppressing the poor") (quoting 32 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 1052 (1979)).
148. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-501-5-531 (McKinney 2000).
149. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.40-190.42 (McKinney 2000).
150. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(a) (McKinney 2000).
151. Id. at § 5-501(6)(b).
152. Joshua Stein, Confusury Unraveled. New York Lenders Face Usury Risks in
Atypical or Small Transactions, N.Y. ST. B.J., Aug. 2001, at 25, 27 (summarizing New
York's various cross referencing usury statutes).
153. The statute reads:
All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, all other contracts or securi-
ties whatsoever ... whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken,
or secured or agreed to be reserved or taken, any greater sum, or greater
value, for the loan ... of any money ... than is prescribed in section 5-501,
shall be void.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000).
154. Id. § 5-513; Stein, supra note 152, at 26.
155. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(e), 190.40 (McKinney 2000).
156. Id. §§ 70.00(2)(c), 190.42.
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II. THE MANDATORY VERSUS DISCRETIONARY STANDARD IN
USURY REMEDIES
While New York's usury prohibitions intend to protect the des-
perate and needy from exploitation by superior bargaining parties,
the harsh penalties for violating usury sometimes interfere with this
lofty purpose. One such example is the ongoing litigation involving
Venture Mortgage Fund. The results from these cases, from the
bankruptcy court all the way to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, show the effect of the harsh mandatory forfeiture standard
of New York's usury laws. This is in contrast with other states,
such as Massachusetts, that have adapted a discretionary usury
remedy standard. This Part explores New York's mandatory stan-
dard by analyzing the recent decisions involving the bankruptcy of
Venture Mortgage Fund and how the various courts have resolved
the cases' usury law implications. This Part will also look at recent
Massachusetts decisions that have analyzed Massachusetts's discre-
tionary standard.
A. The New York Usury Approach: The Mandatory Standard
Under New York's usury law, the remedy for usury is the forfei-
ture of the entire loan principal."5 7 Furthermore, the statutory lan-
guage that all usurious loans "shall be void,"158 has recently been
interpreted by the courts involved in the In re Venture Mortgage
bankruptcy 59 as leaving no room for a reviewing court to impose
other remedies in cases of usury violations. These decisions por-
tray the effects of New York's mandatory usury remedy regime.
1. The Venture Mortgage Fund Bankruptcy
Theodore Brodie was a successful businessman who developed a
relationship with attorney David Schick.160 During the summer of
1992, Schick proposed that Brodie advance him $500,000, which he
would maintain in an escrow account16 1 until repayment, at an an-
157. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000); supra note 153 and accompa-
nying text.
158. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-511(1).
159. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Venture
Mortgage Fund, L.P., 245 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
160. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 460. Brodie had retained Schick as
counsel for several loan transactions involving Brodie lending substantial sums of
money to investors. Id.
161. An escrow account is a bank account held in trust or as security, that is return-
able to the depositor or third party on the fulfillment of a condition. BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 545 (7th ed. 1999). The money was eventually placed in an IOLA, or
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nual interest rate of twenty percent. 6 2 Schick explained that he
needed money in an escrow account so that he could bid on mort-
gage pools offered for sale by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration ("FDIC") and the Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC"). 163 Brodie agreed, after which Brodie received a $500,000
promissory note signed by Schick on behalf of Mortgage Venture
Ltd. ("Venture"). 164 The note called for twenty percent per annum
interest payments to be paid monthly, and the entire principal was
due in December 1992.165 However, Schick did not return the prin-
cipal in December 1992, but continued to pay Brodie the monthly
interest payment throughout 1993, 1994, and 1995.166
In late 1995, Schick called Brodie and proposed to return
$300,000 of the principal, while rolling over the remaining $200,000
balance into another, similar escrow transaction.1 67 The rollover
was to pay two and a quarter percent per month or twenty-seven
percent annually. 168 The note called for monthly interest payments
of $4,500, and repayment of the entire principal on March 21,
1996.169 Brodie received his monthly interest payments in January,
February, and March 1996, but after March, he did not receive any
"interest on lawyer account," authorized by New York law, which permits an attorney
to deposit nominal client and trust funds into an unsegregated, interest-bearing ac-
count. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 466 n.3.
162. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 466.
163. Id. at 466 n.2. In order to convince the FDIC or the RTC that Venture Mort-
gage Fund was a serious investor in mortgage portfolios, Schick had to maintain bank
accounts showing substantial sums at his disposal. Id. at 469. He assured Brodie that
the investment was virtually risk free, with the only danger being the unlikely risk that
the bank might fail. Id. at 466.
164. Id. Because Brodie and Schick were Orthodox Jews, they also executed a
shtar iska, or heter iska. Id. A heter iska structures a transaction as a type of joint
venture under Jewish Law, to avoid the Jewish Law prohibition against charging inter-
est on a loan. Id. The money advanced is treated as a contribution to the venture, but
the lender is entitled to an accounting, which involves an onerous process requiring
two trustworthy witnesses. Id. If the process is not followed, the borrower is required
to pay a fixed monthly returns, called iska payments, and the lender is required to
waive any further profits. Id. See generally YISROEL REISMAN, THE LAWS OF RIBBIS
378-418 (1995) (discussing the laws of usury, known as ribbis, in Jewish Law, and the
details of executing a heter iska according to Jewish Law).
165. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 466.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Brodie agreed to the deal, thanking Schick "for his benevolence." Id.
Schick further acknowledged that he was Brodie's lawyer and assured Brodie that the
transaction was legal. Id.
169. Id.
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further interest payments from Schick, and was never repaid the
$200,000 loan principal.170
ATTASCO was a company formed by two brothers, Allen and
Leonard Sausen.171 The Sausen brothers first met Schick in the fall
of 1993, in connection with some simple mortgage transactions.
1 72
In 1994, after consulting with Theodore Brodie about his invest-
ments with Schick, the Sausen brothers decided to invest with
Schick as well. 173 In July 1995, through one of Schick's associ-
ates, 4 the brothers participated in a loan transaction with Schick,
with which they were extremely satisfied.1
75
In December 1995, Schick proposed the same type of mortgage
portfolio investment that attracted Brodie,'76 where Schick would
borrow money from the Sausens for ninety to one hundred and
twenty days, maintain the money in an attorney's escrow account,
and pay the brothers substantial interest payments.177 However,
Schick advised the Sausens that, in order to participate, they had to
be ready to act within forty-eight hours of Schick's request.
178
Schick also explained to the brothers that, while he usually worked
with clients with substantial means and liquidity, he would be will-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 468. Allen was engaged in the business of exporting appliances and elec-
tronics, while Leonard was a partner with David Brodie, Theodore Brodie's son, in a
manufacturing business. Id. Like Brodie and Schick, the Sausen brothers were Ortho-
dox Jews. Id.
172. Id. Schick assigned the Sausen mortgage transactions to an associate at the
firm, who later acted as the Sausens' intermediary between them and Schick on the
brothers' investment transactions. Id.
173. Id. at 468. Leonard also investigated Schick's reputation and was satisfied to
learn that Schick was an Orthodox Jew, an attorney, an expert in real estate, and a
person regarded as honest and trustworthy. Id.
174. The Sausens did not deal directly with Schick in making the investment, but
rather relied exclusively on Schick's associate. Id. The Sausens did not retain attor-
neys because they trusted the associate based on Theodore Brodie's recommendation.
Id. The associate assured them that the Regal documents were the same as those
prepared by Schick in other similar transactions, and the brothers claimed they had
no reason to question the legality of the loan. Id. at 469.
175. The brothers loaned money to Regal Trade, an entity that Schick used for his
investments. Id. at 468. Allen contributed $350,000 and Leonard $150,000; the pay-
ments were held in escrow by Schick for ninety days at twenty-four percent interest
per annum. Id. at 468 n.7. The Sausens received their interest payments and principal
as promised, "confirming their faith in Schick." Id. at 469.
176. Supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
177. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 469. This time, the Sausens dealt
directly with Schick, instead of going through the associate, because they felt more
comfortable dealing with Schick, and they thought that by cutting out the associate,
they could receive whatever compensation he would otherwise get as his part of the
deal. Id.
178. Id.
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ing to do business with them because he had "a relationship" with
them.179 In late December 1995, the brothers, through ATTASCO,
wired $1.1 million loan in exchange for a promissory note calling
for interest at the monthly rate of two and a quarter percent, or
twenty-seven percent annually, and the return of the principal in
April 1996, as well as a shtar iska.180 The brothers never asked an
independent attorney to review the loan documents, nor did they
request or receive legal advice from Schick.18 1 In February 1996,
the Sausens further invested $850,000 with Schick. 8 The brothers
did not consider it unusual to receive a twenty-seven percent re-
turn on an essentially risk-free investment, because they had to
have the money ready at a moment's notice. 83 Although the
Sausens received the March interest payment, they did not receive
the April payment. 84 The brothers called Schick several times,
and when they finally reached him, he told them that he had bad
news: it was all over, and all of the money was gone.185
2. The Venture Mortgage Fund Scam
In early May 1996, federal law enforcement officials began to
investigate David Schick for accusations that he swindled millions
of dollars from real estate investors and defrauded people through
bogus investments. 186 After a short investigation, federal officials
charged Schick with swindling victims out of nearly $14 million us-
ing bogus real estate schemes. Officials also suspected that Schick's
179. Id. The brothers told Schick that they were neither wealthy, nor sophisticated
investors, and any money that they had to invest represented savings for their chil-
dren. Thus, they did not want to do anything that was risky. Id.
180. Id. Because the Sausens and Schick were Orthodox Jews, they had to execute
a shtar iska. Supra notes 164, 171 (describing a shtar iska).
181. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 469. The Sausens never signed a
retainer agreement with Schick, nor did they receive a bill from or pay a fee to Schick
for legal services. Id. at 470 n.l. Still, the brothers believed that Schick was acting as
their legal counsel when he assured them that he would protect their interests and
that the documents were completely legal. Id. at 470 n.12. They never discussed with
Schick, or anyone else, whether the interest rate was legal under New York law. Id. at
470.
182. Id. Schick told them that he would use the same documents, and that every-
thing, including the payment terms, would remain the same. Id.
183. Id. at 471.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Joseph P. Fried, Lawyer Is Investigated in Real Estate Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 1996, at B4 (discussing the initial fraud allegations brought against Schick).
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fraud extended to more than $50 million. 187 They continued to in-
vestigate Schick's participation in what appeared to be a web of
activities that may have caused his victims to lose a total of $100
million.188 Officials suspected Schick of engaging in a multitude of
schemes, from promises of risk-free investments yielding tremen-
dous profits, to selling multiple mortgages on property he did not
own, to simply stealing money entrusted to him. 89 The majority of
the schemes were essentially similar to the Brodie'90 and Sausen
schemes,19 in which Schick used investor money, supposedly se-
cure in escrow accounts, for the purchase of packages of mort-
gages.1 92 Schick assured his investors that the investments were
risk-free, because he would arrange to resell the mortgages at a
profit simultaneously with the purchase.' 93
While most of his victims appeared to be individual, relatively
unsophisticated Orthodox Jews, it also appeared that he had been
able to defraud more sophisticated investors. Such investors in-
cluded Vindola Ltd., a British organization, which he defrauded
out of $7 million, 94 the original founders of the Snapple company,
and a Swiss bank which loaned Schick $3 million for four
months.1 95 Officials also suspected that "much of what was taken
from later investors went to pay back earlier investors in a failed
pyramid scheme[,]" and that, "some funds may have been used to
pay back investors in legitimate deals that suffered losses."'196 The
news shocked the close-knit "Orthodox Jewish community, [which]
survives through tradition and trust, and [where] the name Schick
symbolized both."' 97 David Schick was known as a "doer of goods
deeds," energetic in charitable work, and a giver of money and free
legal advice to established charities, earning him respect through-
out the community. 198 According to law enforcement officials, this
187. Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Says Brooklyn Lawyer Stole Millions Using Property
Schemes, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at B4 (discussing the federal investigation into
Schick's frauds).
188. Id.
189. Matthew Purdy, The Man with Two Faces; In an Orthodox Jewish World of
Honor, a Fraud Case Shocks, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1996, at 23 (discussing the effect of
Schick's frauds on the Orthodox Jewish community).
190. Supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
191. Supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
192. Purdy, supra note 189, at 23.
193. Id.
194. Fried, supra note 187, at B4.
195. Purdy, supra note 189, at 23.
196. Fried, supra note 187, at B4.
197. Purdy, supra note 189, at 23.
198. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
was part of the scam, first capturing people's respect and then tak-
ing their money.1 99 "When Schick had early success as a real estate
investor, word spread so fast through the Orthodox Jewish" com-
munities that in time, "wealthy Jews around the globe were en-
trusting him with millions" of dollars for his investments.2 °°
In November 1997, Schick pleaded guilty in the federal court-
houses in White Plains and Brooklyn to charges of swindling inves-
tors out of more than $80 million through his bogus mortgage and
real estate schemes. 201 It was not clear as to what motivated
Schick, a man noted for his "investment savvy and good works," to
commit the frauds.20 2 Further puzzling officials was the wherea-
bouts of the missing money, and how much was taken for Schick's
own personal gain and enrichment.20 3 Officials charged that
Schick, "typically used the investors' money either to replace funds
that he had improperly depleted from his attorney escrow accounts
or to repay investors from earlier transactions. '20 4 These activities
created a "snowball effect" that could not be stopped.20 5 Thus,
while Schick's "original intentions were good" and "his modus
operandi was not criminal," due to "unrelated losses stemming
from a 1988 'problem' which came back to 'haunt' him," he began
to use fraudulent means to stay afloat.20 6 What was most clear was
that Schick's failed Ponzi scheme 20 7 created, "a wide swath of fi-
nancial wreckage among the duped investors. 20 8
3. The Bankruptcy Proceedings
In May 1996 several of the swindled investors filed an involun-
tary Chapter 11 petition against Schick and Venture Mortgage
Fund, freezing his assets. 20 9 To date, there have been numerous
proceedings relating to the Schick/Venture Mortgage Fund bank-
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Joseph P. Fried, Brooklyn Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1997, at B3 (discussing the results of the federal investigation of Schick).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Purdy, supra note 189, at 23.
206. Id.
207. "A fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later inves-
tors generates high dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even
larger investments." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 487 (7th ed. 1999).
208. Fried, supra note 201, at B3.
209. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2002); Purdy,
supra note 189, at 23.
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ruptcy. 210 After the various Schick-related bankruptcy cases were
filed, Brodie submitted proofs of his $200,000 claim against the
Venture Mortgage Fund and Schick, while ATTASCO filed a se-
cured claim in the Venture bankruptcy case in the amount of
$2,462,750, which consisted of $1,950,000 of principal and accrued
interest. 211 The trustees challenged and denied the Brodie and AT-
TASCO claims as usurious loans,212 which are void under New
York law.21 3 Because the interest promised by Schick to both
claimants amounted to twenty-seven percent per annum, the bank-
ruptcy court found it was above the twenty-five percent usury limit
and therefore violated New York's criminal usury statute. 214 Thus,
Brodie and the Sausen brothers forfeited their principal as well as
interest.215 The bankruptcy court, in an opinion by Chief Judge
Stuart M. Bernstein, agreed with the trustees in bankruptcy and
denied Brodie and the Sausen brothers their claims for their loan
principal.21 6
Brodie and the Sausens argued that, based on the historical pub-
lic policy purpose of New York's usury statute,2t 7 their transactions
should not be classified as usury.218 They argued that the usury
laws were designed to thwart loan sharking and unscrupulous mon-
eylenders,219 while they were not loan sharks and Schick was not a
needy or desperate borrower.22° Furthermore, they were the vic-
tims of Schick's fraudulent scheme. 22 Brodie and the Sausens also
argued that Schick and Venture Mortgage Fund were estopped
210. E.g., In re Schick, 246 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Schick, 235 B.R.
318 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Schick, 234 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re
Schick, 232 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Schick, 223 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Schick, No. 96-B-42902, 1998 WL 419320 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1998); In re Schick, No. 97-CIV- 9300, 1998 WL 397849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1998); In re Schick, 215 B.R. 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Schick, No. 96-B-42902, 1997 WL 465217 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1997).
211. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 245 B.R. 460, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
212. Id. at 471.
213. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000); supra text accompanying
note 153.
214. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2000); supra text accompanying note
155.
215. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 478.
216. Id.
217. Supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
218. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 475.
219. Id. at 475; supra note 147 and accompanying text.
220. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 475.
221. Id. They argued that they placed their trust, money, and reliance in Schick's
reputation, knowledge, and ability. Id.
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from asserting a usury defense because they relied on a "special
relationship" with Schick when he induced them to lend him the
money.
222
While the court was aware of their plight,223 it ultimately re-
jected these arguments based on two arguments.224 First, the trust-
ees satisfied their prima facie burden of proving usury by showing
that the note on its face reserved an illegal rate of interest. 225 Sec-
222. Id. Under New York law, the New York Court of Appeals has recognized that
[A] borrower may be estopped from interposing a usury defense when,
through a special relationship with the lender, the borrower induces reliance
on the legality of the transaction .... Otherwise, a borrower could void the
transaction, keep the principal, and achieve a total windfall, at the expense
of an innocent person, through his own subterfuge and inequitable
deception.
Seidel v. 18 East 17th St. Owners, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 7, 11 (N.Y. 1992), quoted in, In re
Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 475. Another New York court expressed the rule
as follows:
A borrower, who, because of a fiduciary or other like relationship of trust
with the lender, is under a duty to speak and who fails to disclose the illegal-
ity of the rate of interest he proposes, is estopped from asserting the defense
of usury where the lender rightfully relies upon the borrower in making the
loan.
Abramovitz v. Kew Realty Equities, Inc., 580 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(holding that defendants were estopped from asserting a usury defense where they
induced the plaintiff to advance them $650,000 at twenty-five percent interest to fur-
ther their real estate interests by taking advantage of plaintiff's long-standing friend-
ship and trust in his attorney). Brodie and the Sausens claimed that they had "relied"
on Schick in furnishing the loan documents and the interest rates, and they were now
being penalized for the interest rate that the debtor himself furnished. Furthermore,
they asserted that Schick's conduct and representations were intended to, and did, in
fact, influence them to their injury, and Schick could not now absolve himself from a
loan which he himself had proposed. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 475.
223. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 478 ("It was unfortunate for the
claimants that something that seemed too good to be true, in the end, was neither too
good nor too true.").
224. Id. ("But they have failed to offer any legal or factual reason to except them-
selves from the usury defense asserted by the trustees for the benefit of the other
unpaid creditors in these cases.").
225. Id. at 474. Criminal usury requires proof that the lender knowingly charged
annual interest exceeding twenty-five percent on a loan or forbearance. It is only
necessary to show intent to charge a rate above the legal rate, rather than a specific
intent to violate the usury statute. Id. at 473. While usurious intent is generally self-
evident, it is usually up to the jury to determine intent. WEBB, supra note 44, § 33, at
33. If the contract calls for excessive interest, intent is virtually shown, or at least
imputed by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at § 35, at 35; see BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990) (defining res ipsa loquitur as "a test to determine
whether a defendant has.., committed an attempt, based on whether the defendant's
act itself indicated to an observer what the defendant intended to do."). However, it
is generally agreed that in most usury regimes there is no need to prove actual inten-
tion to violate the usury law; ignorance of the law is not a defense. LEYMASTER, supra
note 38, § 2.2.6, at 10, 11; WEBB, supra note 44, § 41, at 42.
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ondly, under New York's general principles of statutory construc-
tion, the clear and unambiguous language of a statute should be
construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words.22 6
Because New York's criminal usury statute does not distinguish
among types of borrowers or lenders, their relative knowledge and
sophistication, or the purpose of the loan, general equitable consid-
erations could not change the result.22 7 The court also rejected the
claimants' reliance defense based on a "special relationship" with
Schick. 2 8 In Brodie's case, the court concluded the rollover was a
business transaction between the two, and that Brodie did not seek
or pay for any legal advice from Schick. 2 9 Similarly, the Sausens
never sought legal advice from Schick, but rather they understood
that they were involved in business deals with Schick. 23' Further-
more, the court found that Brodie and the Sausens did not naively
place an unquestioned trust in Schick,2 3 1 nor did they appear con-
cerned about the legality of a specific interest rate. 32 The court
concluded that Brodie and the Sausen brothers had failed to except
themselves from the usury defense asserted by the bankruptcy
trustees.233
4. The Appeal
Brodie and the Sausens appealed their case to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In an opin-
ion by Judge Berman, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's conclusion.2 34 The claimants then further appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Sec-
226. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 245 B.R. at 475.
227. Id. at 474-75.
228. Id. The court stated that, for a reliance defense to succeed, the lender must
prove: (1) a "special relationship" with the borrower; (2) a representation by the bor-
rower that the transaction was legal; (3) an intent by the borrower to induce reliance
on the representation; (4) actual reliance; and (5) injury. Examples of a "special rela-
tionship" would include an attorney-client relationship, a fiduciary or trust relation-
ship, or a longstanding friendship or similar relationship. Id. In addition, it is usually
characterized by superior knowledge, experience, or sophistication that enables the
borrower to induce the lender to make the loan at a usurious rate. Id. The fact that
the borrower suggests the interest rate, standing alone, will not allow the lender to
prevail against a usury defense. Id. at 476.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 477 ("They pursued him as a source of investment, not legal advice.").
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 478.
234. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2002), affg 245
B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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ond Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.235 The Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis mirrored that of the bankruptcy court. The
court noted that, although Schick could not be described as desper-
ately poor and the claimants could not be described as loan
sharks,236 New York's usury laws do not recognize these distinc-
tions.237 Furthermore, the court found that the bankruptcy court
did not clearly err in finding that, although Schick was a lawyer
whom the claimants had once consulted on an unrelated matter
and was a person they trusted to assure the legal enforceability of
the loans,238 there was no "special relationship" between Schick
and the claimants.239 The court also concluded that neither Brodie
nor the Sausen brothers relied on Schick for any advice that the
loan transactions conformed to the law.240
5. The Criminal Versus Civil Usury Distinction
The Second Circuit's opinion is notable for its dicta regarding
whether a loan is void if it violates New York's criminal usury stat-
ute without violating New York's civil usury statute.241 While this
assumption went unchallenged in both the Southern District and
the bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit felt that it remained an
open question under New York law.242 The court felt the need to
discuss the issue because: (1) it is likely to arise again and is of
potential importance in the bankruptcy courts; (2) New York
courts have not recognized the issue; and (3) the opinion might
otherwise be misread to settle or foreclose the issue in the federal
courts of the Second Circuit.243 Thus, the court wanted to empha-
size that the ruling reflected no implicit resolution of the issue.2 4
The court began its analysis by pointing out that a close reading
of the complex and cross-referencing usury statutes indicated that
only those loans that violate the civil usury statute should be
void.245 There is nothing in the criminal usury statute that provides
235. Id.
236. Id. at 188. "[I]f anything, [they were] the victims of the transactions." Id.
237. Id.
238. In addition to drafting the loan documents himself. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 188-89.
241. Id. at 189 ("The following is therefore dictum.").
242. Id. at 190.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 189; supra note 153 (quoting the language of New York's civil usury
remedies statute). § 5-511 voids a loan that violates the civil usury statute, as enacted
in N.Y. GEN OBLIG. § 5-501 (McKinney 2000), but says nothing about a loan that
2220
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for voiding, and the court determined that it remained unclear
whether the New York legislature intended that criminally usurious
loans of $250,000 or greater should be voided as well.24 6 However,
one who commits criminal usury should not be in a better position
than a usurer who charges a non-criminal rate of interest.247 The
Second Circuit noted that the New York Court of Appeals had sug-
gested such a result, based on the legislative history to the criminal
usury statute which stated that, "it would be most inappropriate to
permit a usurer to recover on a loan for which he could be prose-
cuted. '24 8 On the other hand, the Second Circuit also recognized
that borrowers of large loans do not likely need or deserve finan-
cial protection.249 Moreover, the greater the amount of the loan,
the more unsettling the forfeiture becomes to financial arrange-
ments.250 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that because Bro-
die's $200,000 loan violated both the civil and the criminal usury
statutes,25I and was thus void.252 The Sausens' loans violated only
the criminal usury statute 253 because they exceeded $250,000.254
Therefore, whether there was any authority for voiding the two
Sausen loans remains an open question.255
The Second Circuit decided that although the Brodie and the
Sausens were victims of an elaborate scam, they could not recover
their loan principal under New York's usury law. The Second Cir-
cuit left open whether there is statutory authority to void a loan
that violates only New York's criminal usury statute, but the possi-
bility remains that a creditor may lose his principal, even when eq-
uity suggests otherwise. While the facts in In re Venture Mortgage
Fund may lead to the conclusion that such situations are rare, it is
violates the criminal usury statute, as enacted in N.Y. PENAL § 190.40 (McKinney
2000). See N.Y. GEN OBLIG. § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000) ("whereupon or whereby
there shall be reserved or taken, or secured or agreed to be reserved or taken, any
greater sum, or greater value, for the loan ... of any money ... than is prescribed in
section 5-501, shall be void") (emphasis added). Thus, there appears to be no specific
statutory authority for voiding a loan that violates the criminal usury statute but that
does not violate the civil usury statute. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 282 F.3d at 189.
246. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 282 F.3d at 189.
247. Id.
248. Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 278, 283 (N.Y. 1981) (quot-
ing 1965 N.Y. Laws 328, at 46-50).
249. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 282 F.3d at 189.
250. Id.
251. Supra text accompanying note 150.
252. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 282 F.3d at 189.
253. Supra text accompanying note 150.
254. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, 282 F.3d at 190 n.4.
255. Id. at 190.
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conceivable that there are other situations where principles of eq-
uity should nullify the result of New York's usury regime.
B. The Massachusetts Usury Approach: The
Discretionary Standard
Like New York's usury law, the remedy for usury in Massachu-
setts is the forfeiture of the entire loan principal. 56 However, un-
like New York's mandatory standard, the Massachusetts statute
states that usurious loans "may be declared void. '257 In a series of
landmark cases, such as Beach Associates, Inc. v. Fauser 58 and
Begelfer v. Najarian,259 the Massachusetts courts have interpreted
Massachusetts's usury statutes as imposing a discretionary, rather
than mandatory, usury remedy. These decisions portray the effects
of Massachusetts's discretionary usury remedy regime.
1. The Beach Associates Case
Beach Associates involved a South Carolina corporation, Beach
Associates, Inc., a real estate development company, that desired
to purchase land in Massachusetts. 6 ° It wished to borrow $100,000
for "bridge" financing from Fauser and others, who were investors
in real estate dealings.26' The contract term was for three years
with interest payments of one and a half percent per month, plus a
finder's fee of one-half percent per month, for a total rate of
twenty-four percent per annum.262 This was in excess of Massachu-
setts's twenty percent interest usury limit.2 63 Eight months later,
Beach Associates was unable to secure long-term financing for its
project and stopped making payments. 264 Beach Associates argued
that because the loan violated Massachusetts's usury statute,2 65 the
entire loan should be declared void pursuant to Massachusetts
256. Infra note 266.
257. MASS. GEN. LAw ch. 271, § 49(c) (2001).
258. Beach Assocs., Inc. v. Fauser, 401 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
259. Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 1980).
260. Beach Assocs., 401 N.E.2d at 860.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 271, § 49(a) ("[W]hoever in exchange for either a loan of
money or other property knowingly contracts for.., interest and expenses the aggre-
gate of which exceeds an amount greater than twenty per centum per annum ... shall
be guilty of criminal usury . . ").
264. Beach Assocs., 401 N.E.2d at 861.
265. Supra note 263.
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law. 66 It based its argument on the fact that, although the statute's
language stated that a usurious loan "may be declared void, 267 this
language must be construed as mandatory, and therefore judges
have no choice but to void such transactions in their entirety.2 68 It
also claimed that because Massachusetts's criminal usury statute
was drafted as a response to "the vicious offense of loan sharking,"
the intent of the legislature was to void such usurious loans.2 69
However, the court disagreed and held that the usury remedy pro-
vision was not to be construed as mandatory.7 0
2. The Begelfer v. Najarian Case
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the Beach
Associates ruling in Begelfer v. Najarian.27' The case involved a
group of individuals who were in the business of buying, selling,
renting, constructing, and renovating residential properties. 2  To
further their interests, they executed nine notes for a total loan of
$300,000.273 Richard Najarian, who owned a pharmacy, was asked
by two other investors to participate in the loan.274 After he
agreed, the developers executed a promissory note in the amount
of $30,000, with interest at the rate of fifteen percent per year on
the unpaid balance until paid.27 5 Later, the note was extended, in-
creasing the interest rate to seventeen percent per year.276 How-
ever, there were overdue charges that brought the effective rate of
interest to over twenty percent. 7  After about a year, when the
developers could not make the payments, they claimed a usury de-
fense, arguing that the statutory language required any usurious
266. MASS. GEN. LAw ch. 271, § 49(c) ("Any loan at a rate of interest proscribed
under the provisions of paragraph (a) may be declared void by the ... superior court
in equity upon petition by the person to whom the loan was made.").
267. Id.
268. Beach Assocs., 401 N.E.2d at 862.
269. Id. at 862 n.5. In 1970, the governor of Massachusetts recommended the pas-
sage of a usury law to provide an effective tool against organized crime, as the usury
law was designed to protect the necessitous debtor from outrageous demands by lend-
ers. Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 1980) (citing Goldstock & Coenen,
supra note 1, at 180-84).
270. Beach Assocs., 401 N.E.2d at 862 ("We find nothing... which lends support to
the plaintiffs' claim that ... a court must, at the borrower's request, void a loan on the
basis of excessive interest.").
271. Begelfer, 409 N.E.2d at 167.
272. Id. at 170.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 173.
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loan be declared void, and that they were thus relieved of any obli-
gation to pay back the principal. 2
78
The Begelfer court agreed with the Beach Associates holding and
held that there was no apparent legislative intent that a usurious
loan must be declared void, unless the circumstances and condi-
tions of the agreement would cause the integrity of the loan itself
to be questionable. 279 Furthermore, the appropriate remedy is de-
rived by balancing a number of factors, including the importance of
the public policy against usury; whether a refusal to enforce the
term will further that policy; and the gravity of the misconduct in-
volved.28 ° The court concluded that, in the Begelfer case, the
proper equitable remedy was to strike the default provision of the
note as offensive to the statute, but preserve the obligation to re-
pay the loan principal. 281 According to the court, "Such a remedy
is a proper accommodation between enforcing the public policy un-
derlying the prohibitions of the act and preventing an undeserved
windfall to the plaintiffs. '282 The Beach Associates and Begelfer
standards remain the law in Massachusetts today.
Il. USURY'S EQUITABLE POLICY AND NEW YORK'S USURY
REMEDIES-A TALE OF OPPOSITES
Case law and statutory history suggests that New York's usury
regime was geared towards the protection of the unsophisticated
and desperate borrower.283 Thus, New York does not allow a cor-
poration to claim the defense of usury on a loan agreement.284
Loans over $250,000 are exempt from civil usury,2 85 and loans over
$2,500,000 are exempt from all usury restrictions. 2 6 As the New
York Court of Appeals has indicated, society is better off with free
financial markets, so long as "desperate" borrowers are pro-
tected.287 However, this framework leads to some confusion. For
example, while loans over $250,000 are exempt from civil usury,
they are still subject to criminal usury. This leads to a strange re-
278. Id.
279. Id. at 174.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text.
284. Supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
285. Supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
286. Supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
287. Golden, supra note 130, at 24 (citing Schneider v. Phelps, 359 N.E.2d 1361,
1364-65 (N.Y. 1977)).
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suit where a lender may issue a $1,000,000 loan to a corporation, at
a fully negotiated rate exceeding twenty-five percent, and thereby
commit a crime. z88
This Part first examines how the courts have adhered to the pub-
lic policy behind the usury laws, and how New York's harsh usury
remedies can lead to inequitable results. Then, this Part analyzes
specifically the In re Venture Mortgage Fund decisions to determine
if the decisions by the bankruptcy court and the Second Circuit
represent the counterproductive nature of the usury remedies. Fi-
nally, this Part looks at other usury remedy regimes, especially
those found in Massachusetts, and argues that remedies based on a
discretionary standard are the most effective tools to combat usury,
and at the same time, preserve equitable results.
A. New York Courts' Attitude Toward the Forfeiture of
Principal Remedy
Despite early case law to the contrary, the usury remedy of for-
feiture of the entire loan principal still remains the law in New
York.289 Despite early commissions set up to propose changes to
the usury laws that suggested that the "forfeiture of principal" rem-
edy be abandoned, 9 ° the New York legislature has declined to
soften the harsh remedy. This was a source of friction between the
legislative and judicial bodies in New York, with the legislature
taking a hard line approach, while the judiciary had looked to more
equitable principles.291 The courts have frequently concluded that,
while New York's usury remedies may be harsh, they are at the
mercy of the clear language of the usury statutes. As one early
New York court stated:
The taking of [usury] for the loan or forbearance of money is
prohibited and renders the contract void. The ostensible object
of the statute is to protect the weak, the needy, and the unwary
from the rapacity of the avaricious. The penalty is severe. Per-
haps unnecessarily so. That, however, is for the lawmaking
body. The courts must apply the law as they find it.2 92
With all this statutory history in mind, the justification for unilat-
erally voiding a usurious contract without discussing the equitable
considerations, the nature of the parties involved, or the nature of
288. Id.
289. Supra Part I.C.
290. Supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
291. Supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
292. Universal Credit Co., v. Lowell, 2 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938).
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the negotiations, must be examined. The New York usury statute
completely ignores these considerations. As is evident from the
recent In re Mortgage Venture Fund decisions, this problem is not
remote, and the Second Circuit even noted that the problem may
frequently arise.293 By analyzing the equitable concerns raised by
the In re Venture Mortgage decisions, the problems with New
York's current usury regime may be identified, and measures to
correct them can be proposed.
B. Equitable Considerations of In re Venture Mortgage
From the bankruptcy court to the Second Circuit, the In re Ven-
ture Mortgage courts all recognized that Brodie and the Sausens
were wronged.294 The courts admitted that the harsh criminal
usury statutes were enacted in 1965 to combat the growing prob-
lem of organized crime and usury, and that usury was designed to
stop loan sharks who used "roughing up tactics" to enforce pay-
ment, obtained control of legitimate businesses, and oppressed the
poor.295 The courts realized that neither Brodie, nor the Sausens
fit the description of the classic loan shark.296 Nevertheless, the
courts correctly held that in the face of clear legislative language,
they were powerless to override legislative intent with equity
concerns.
297
However, the courts could have found for Brodie and the
Sausens by using the "special relationship" defense raised by the
claimants.2 98 The courts rejected these claims.299 It is possible that
they were reluctant to adopt a broad "special relationship" stan-
dard that would undermine legislative intent. The statute does not
make any distinction as to what type of usurer is involved, merely
grouping all usurers under one umbrella, leading to the forfeiture
of the loan principal, the courts were reluctant to broaden the
"special relationship" test and circumvent the statute.3 °°
The courts, however, with the possible exception of the Second
Circuit, minimized the extent of how Brodie and the Sausens were
in fact victims. It seems that they were duped by a criminal. The
courts failed to elaborate on the extent of Schick's fraud, even
293. Supra note 244 and accompanying text.
294. Supra notes 223, 236 and accompanying text.
295. Supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
296. Supra notes 223-227, 236 and accompanying text.
297. Supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
298. Supra note 222 and accompanying text.
299. Supra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
300. Supra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
2226
2002] INEQUITY OF NEW YORK'S USURY REMEDIES 2227
though the evidence suggests that it was enormous. Schick de-
frauded many innocent people out of a staggering $80 million, and
possibly more, including many experienced and sophisticated busi-
ness entities.30 1 Furthermore, Brodie and the Sausens did to a
large extent rely on Schick's representations because they were all
part of the tight-knit Orthodox Jewish community.30 2 The trustee's
drive to exclude Brodie's and the Sausens' claims, "for the benefit
of the other unpaid creditors in [the bankruptcy] cases '30 3 seems
laughable when most of the creditors were in fact put in the same
position, had invested in similar transactions,30 4 and had the same
fraud claims against Schick.30 5 Brodie and Sausen gave their hard
earned savings to a man who may never have had any intention of
returning it.306 All the other creditors did the same. They all lost
their money to a savvy thief's scam.30 7 However, unlike the other
investors, New York's usury law brands Brodie and the Sausens as
criminals because were promised a few percentage points more,
ensuring that they will never see their money again. In light of
these considerations, the results in the In re Venture Mortgage cases
can hardly be considered equitable.
C. How to Rectify the Problem: The Case for
Judicial Discretion
The underlying problem with the New York usury statutory re-
gime seems to revolve around the long-standing friction between
the legislature and the courts. 30 8 The legislature, in an effort to
crack down on loan sharking and other predatory practices, 30 9 de-
vised the harshest usury remedy available under the circumstances:
the forfeiture of the entire loan principal, by declaring that all usu-
rious loans "shall be void. ' 310 This unilateral declaration of usuri-
ous loan avoidance leaves no room for any leeway by a reviewing
court. In the legislature's defense, this remedy creates a substantial
deterrent effect. Yet, in situations such as the Brodie and Sausen
301. Supra Part II.A.2.
302. Supra note 173 and accompanying text. Indeed, most of Schick's fraudulent
activities were at the expense of his own community. Supra Part II.A.2.
303. In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 245 B.R. 460, 478 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff'd 282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002).
304. Supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
305. Supra Part II.A.2.
306. Supra Part II.A.2.
307. Supra Part II.A.2.
308. Supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
309. Supra Part I.D.
310. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2000); supra note 153.
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loans, courts should make an exception to this harsh rule to pre-
vent an otherwise inequitable result. Brodie and the Sausens were
arguably not loan sharks, but, after In re Venture Mortgage Fund,
the New York courts appear set to treat them as such anyway. Fur-
thermore, although the other creditors behaved similarly to Brodie
and the Sausens, because of just a few percentage points of inter-
est, they were not branded "usurers" and were thus able to recover
their investments. Surely that small difference does not create the
distinction between a true loan shark and an innocent creditor.
Thus, the solution is to construct a statutory framework that takes
these case-by-case factors into account when fashioning a usury
remedy. Under New York's current regime, such an analysis is not
possible.
A solution to this dilemma is to allow a court to use its discretion
when meting out usury remedies. This would satisfy the legisla-
ture's desire to curtail loan sharks while at the same time sparing
the harsh usury remedies from relatively harmless offenders. As
the statute now reads, that all usurious loans "shall be void," '311 a
New York court is forced to apply the forfeiture of principal rem-
edy for all usurious loans, regardless of the circumstances involved.
This unilateral declaration could easily be changed to a discretion-
ary tone, such as adopting a "may be declared void" standard. This
would grant a reviewing court a full arsenal of usury remedies,
ranging from a harsh forfeiture of principal remedy for the most
egregious offenses, to more benign remedies, such the forfeiture of
the total interest or the forfeiture of the illegal interest only, as
have been applied in New York's early usury case law.312
This is a workable approach and has been adopted by other
states, most notably Massachusetts. The Massachusetts courts have
crafted equitable solutions by a careful reading of the Massachu-
setts usury statutes. The statutory framework in Massachusetts
grants a court the necessary tools to provide for the widest range of
possible usury remedies. Unlike New York's mandatory stan-
dard,313 which unilaterally imposes a single harsh usury remedy,
Massachusetts's discretionary standard does not compel a court to
impose a mandatory avoidance of the usurious contract.314 In-
stead, a Massachusetts court may examine each usury contract on a
case-by-case factual analysis to determine the appropriate remedy.
311. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1); supra note 153.
312. Supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
313. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1); supra note 153.
314. Supra notes 266-82 and accompanying text.
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For example, the Beach Associates court drew a distinction be-
tween different lenders.315 Where a loan is made by an unlicensed
lender, the loan itself offends the usury statute in respect to its goal
"to prohibit the unlicensed business of making small loans," and
creating a basis for voiding the loan.316 However, where the loan is
made by a licensed lender, the statute wishes only "to prevent an
excessive rate of interest. ' 317 Thus, in this case the court was al-
lowed to uphold the basic validity of the loan, and to grant the
borrower relief commensurate with his injury.318 It is within the
discretion of the judge, based upon all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the loan, to either void it entirely, to demand a refund,
to credit any excessive interest paid, to reform the contract, or to
provide any other relief consistent with equitable principles.319
The court found that the judge's decision to simply reform the con-
tract by reducing the interest rate, rather than void the entire loan
principal, was an adequate remedy in equity.320 The court looked
to such factors as the following: the interest rate was agreed upon
by all the parties after negotiation; the plaintiffs never complained
about the transaction until after they were unable to make the pay-
ments; and the parties freely entered into the transaction at arms-
length.32 1 Because of the statutory construction of Massachusetts's
usury statute, the judge may exercise discretion when fashioning an
equitable remedy and granting relief, which can include harsh mea-
sures such as voiding the loan, or if equity requires a less severe
remedy, a reduction of the excessive interest rate charged to a rate
that is legally permissible.322
315. Beach Assocs., Inc. v. Fauser, 401 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980):
The distinction between ... [w]here the loan is by an unlicensed lender the
statute['s] ... goal [is] 'to prohibit the unlicensed business of making small
loans' [hence the loan is void] . . .[but] where, however, the loan is by a
licensed lender, [the statute's goal is] 'to prevent an excessive rate of inter-
est' on the small loan .... [T]he court [is allowed to] uphold the basic valid-
ity of the loan where the loan itself is inoffensive, and to grant the borrower
relief commensurate with his injury.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 864.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 861, 864.
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D. The Discretionary Usury Remedy Standard-Restoring
Equitable Principles to New York's Usury Regime
The Massachusetts approach, namely a statutorily authorized
discretionary standard, would remedy a situation such as Brodie
and the Sausen brothers found themselves in. A usury provision
mandating that any usurious loan "may be declared void," allows
the courts to utilize their full range of equitable powers, including
having the option to void the loan, in order to reach an appropriate
result in each particular case. The courts may take into considera-
tion circumstances such as coercion, threat of violence, or a situa-
tion where a desperate debtor was taken advantage of by an
unscrupulous lender. It would be within the discretion of the
judge, based on all the facts, circumstances and conditions sur-
rounding the usurious loan, to void it, to rescind it, to refund, to
credit any excessive interest paid, to reform the contract, or to pro-
vide any other relief as equity requires.
This suggestion does not advocate a major overhaul of New
York's usury regime, such as would be required with an unconscio-
nability standard to usury enforcement.323 An unconscionability
standard324 is worrisome, and legislators may be reluctant to put
too much power into the hands of the judiciary and essentially
leave it up to the judge to decide in each case whether the usury
law has in fact been violated. By only allowing for judicial discre-
tion in fashioning usury remedies, but not to determine if usury
was actually committed, the legislature can preserve the integrity
of the usury law while still allowing some leeway in fashioning eq-
uitable results.
If a discretionary approach had been adopted, an equitable re-
sult could have been easily achieved in In re Venture Mortgage
Fund. While the facts are not the same as in the Beach Associates
and Begelfer cases,325 the factors applied by the latter courts could
easily have been applied to both Brodie and the Sausens. Both
parties freely entered into this transaction at arms-length.326
Schick never complained about the transaction until the trustee
brought up the usury claim in bankruptcy. There were no circum-
stances or conditions that would have caused the integrity of the
loan itself to be questionable. There was no coercion or threat of
323. Supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
324. Supra note 19.
325. Supra Part II.B.
326. Supra Part II.A.1.
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violence. Finally, Schick was not a desperate debtor who was being
taken advantage of by an unscrupulous lender.327
Furthermore, it is in the legislature's best interest to clarify New
York's usury statute. As the Second Circuit pointed out, from a
careful reading of the usury statutes it appears, and a court may
later find, that if a loan violates only the criminal usury law, the
loan is not void.328 However, because Brodie and the Sausens
never raised the issue, the Second Circuit did not rule on it.
329
Thus, it remains an open question, and there is the danger that if a
court is confronted with a true loan shark whose loan violates only
criminal usury, it may find that the loan should not be void. It is
thus in the legislature's best interest to preserve a court's option of
voiding a loan if it violates criminal usury only; however, the legis-
lature should proceed with caution and allow judges the discretion
to provides an appropriate remedy.
The legislature may be hesitant to give courts discretion in fash-
ioning usury remedies. However, they can still provide for effec-
tive usury enforcement while still ensuring equitable results. For
example, the legislature can continue the harsher penalties for any-
one who knowingly makes usurious loans to desperate debtors,
while providing for lesser punishments when the loans are made on
an equal, or almost equal, footing. To combat loan sharks, New
York's usury statutes should also contain harsher penalties for
making usurious loans with the threat of violence. Finally, the leg-
islature can adopt a broader reliance defense to usury, such as
when a creditor relies on the debtor to furnish an acceptable inter-
est rate that will trigger less severe remedies.
CONCLUSION
In light of the historical and policy considerations behind New
York's usury laws, the current usury regime can lead to inequitable
results. It is important for the legislature to revisit this area and
provide for remedies that allow for judicial discretion, such as pro-
vided by Massachusetts. By preserving the harsh remedies, but al-
lowing for judicial discretion, the usury laws will in no way lose
327. Supra note 236 and accompanying text.
328. Supra notes 241-255 and accompanying text.
329. Supra notes 244-255 and accompanying text. This question would have af-
fected the Sausen brothers' loans, as their loans violated only New York's criminal
usury statute, but not the civil usury statute. Supra notes 253-254 and accompanying
text. It would not have affected Brodie's loans which violated both the civil and crim-
inal usury statutes. Supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
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their effectiveness; while at the same time preventing the cases
where a strict interpretation of the law would lead to inequitable
and unfair results. The statutes can be drafted to ensure that the
real "loan sharks" are brought to justice and pay the full price for
their actions, while allowing the relatively harmless offenders to
escape the harsh penalties that do not fit their crimes. It is time for
New York to take a hard look at their outdated and wholly archaic
usury statues, and realize that a few harsh provisions cannot regu-
late the complexities of the credit world. An equity-based usury
regime that allows for equitable discretion by the judiciary has
worked in the past, and can work and be adaptive to today's socie-
tal needs.
